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The source of knowledge is experience.
Experience is of two kinds-our own, &that of others.
Knowledge gained from our own experience is most expensive.
Mystery & ignorance are always coexistent.
learn the truth & the mystery will disappear.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110014405 2019-08-30T16:22:06+00:00Z
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National Aeronautics & Space Administration
NASA's Constellation program - based largely on
existing technologies - was based on a vision of returning
astronauts back to the Moon by 2020.
However, the progra11t tvas over budget, behind
schedule, & lacking in innovation due to a failure to
invest in critical new technologies.
The President's Budget cancels Constellation &
replaces it with a bold new approach that invests in the
building blocks of a more capable approach to space.
In the last 20 years NASA has spent at least $21 B on
canceled Space Transportation Programs
-7% of its Budget
Overruns can have real consequences
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•National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Mars Science Lab (MSL) Status
-the search for life
MSL Project Overview
Science
Focus on Past & Present Habitability ofMars
Highly Capable Analytical Laboratory
Next Generation Remote Sensing & Contact Investigations
Suite ofEnvironmental Monitoring Instruments
Planned Launch: Oct-Dec 2011
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Technical Capabilities
One Mars Year surface operational
lifetime (669 sols/687 days)
Discovery Responsive over wide range of
latitudes and altitudes
Precision Landing via Guided Entry
Skycrane Propulsive Landing
Long Distance Traverse Capability (20 km)
Flexible & Robust Sample Acquisition &
Processing
July 2009
Legend:
$650M MSL Growth Timeline .-$1,381N,f-----.-----------------..... 2005
Date of Review
$1,645M
6/2007
KDP accelerated up from
Baseline
$1,645M
8/2006
$1,546M
12/2005
- $1,381M
2005
Phase
A
Rebaseline Review 06/2009
Cost: $2,394M
2011 Cost $2,470M
$2,271M
12/2008
o LRD delayed
from 2009 to
2011
o -$240M
increase
$2,031M
10/2008
o -$140M
increase
$1,886M
6/2008
-$200M
increase
Re-
Baseline
10/2007 AA
reinstates
Instrument
Descopes
$1,671M
8/2007
o One instrument
Deleted & two
instruments
have descopes
o -$27M in
descopes in
addition to cost
increase
Current Launch date late 2011
Original plan to launch in 2009 5
MSL Finding #4
o Lack of quantitative evidence for findings provided at KDP &
Rebaseline Reviews
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James Web Space Telescope (JWST)
Cost &Schedule History
Current $6.58
6,000 ...,.----------------------------
LRD: 2014/2015
Hubble primary
mirror
5,000 +-------------------------........"".,.11:::%..--
2,000 +------------"'7fI&-------
4,000 +--------------------~-------
1,000 +------------,~-----------
a3,000 +----------------...,IfC---
FY95 FY99 FY01 FY03 FY04 FY06 FY09
Current launch date rumored to be between 2018-2024
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History on 40 Spacecraft Projects
Interrelationship of Cost and Schedule*
200% -,--------------------------,
150%
%Cost Growth = 1.2348 * %Schedule Growth
R2 = 0.6124
•
-Recent results from study of 40
NASA missions show correlation
between cost & schedule growth
-The corresponding relationship
states that for every 10 percent
of schedule growth, there should
be a corresponding 12 percent
increase in cost growth.
-Although the variations can be
significant, a general rule of
thumb could be followed that
states that for every percent of
schedule growth, there will more
than likely be an equal or greater
percent of cost growth.
100%80%60%40%20%
•
-50% +--------,----..,---------.-----..,------i
0%
0%
Interrelationship of Cost and Schedule Growth for
Non-Restricted Launch Window Projects
~ 100%
C)
~ 50%
* Using Historical NASA Cost and Schedule Growth to Set Future Program and Project Reserve Guidelines
Presented at the IEEE Aerospace Conference, March 3-10, 2007, Big Sky, Montana
History of 96 Spacecraft Projects
1st Available Cost Estimate to Last Available Cost Estimate
-0.1673
5.4619
0.9326
::::0.0660
0.5085
1.0726
1.6606
0.1519
1.3469
2.6022
o
RiskBetaGeneral(O.98679,26.007,-O.16733,29.928)
-0.07 2.87
.-l
I
5.0% - Input:O:::~=F~~Tiii~~Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Mode0.8 +------++---+--I-J~--If-+-----+-----'!----Median
Std Dev
Skewness
25%
0.6 f-'---H----"-+-----f------1-+----+------r------' 75%
90%
OAiI-;--
0.2 -I---t+'.----I---,
I - BetaGeneral
--l Minimum -0.1673
I Maximum 29.9280
Mean 0.9328
Mode -0.1673
--+----J-- Median 0.6100
Std Dev 1.0675
Skewness 1.8026
I 25% 0.1551
0.0 "---.J.+.----I----;----l...;,----I---~--___II75% 1.3753
T""'l N M '¢" LI'l 1.0 90% 2.3589
Cost Growth in Hundreds of 0/0
5.0%1.0':====Data includes projects
at various phases of
development.
Only 12.5% chance of completing project on or under budget.
Average cost growth: 93°J'o & Median: 51°J'o
If overruns are consistent they can be predicted
Probably understated due to re-baselining &cancellation events.
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The project team protests....
"But these are spacecraft
projects
facilities are easier."
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Recent Facility Cost and Schedule Growth
• A-3 Test Stand
• $157 M initial estimate
• $320 M current project estimate
• 2.04 times original
• $366 M ICE estimate
• Latest available duration 7 years 1.75 times longer than original estimate
• SET
• $ 63 M original estimate
• $152 M latest available estimate
• 2.41 times original estimate
• Latest available duration 7 years 1.75 times longer than original estimate
• O&C IOZ
• $ 18 M original estimate
• $55.2 M latest available estimate
• $55.3 M ICE estimate
• 3.07 time original estimate
• Construction Duration 18 months original- actual 27.3 months (1.52 times)
• Hydro Impact Basin
• Conceptual Design Construction Cost Estimate: $1.89M
• Final Design Construction Cost Estimate: $2.60M
• Construction duration
• 90 days estimate
• 210 days reality
• 2.33 times lonQer than oriQinal
Data
suggests the
larger the
project the
higher the
cost growth
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A3 Cost History
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A3 - Schedule
Assessment Date
Year 9
FY15
YearS
FYl4
Year 7
FYl3
Test Need Date*
Test Need Date
I
I
Year 6
FYl2
Year 5
FYl1
I
I
I
I
Year 4
FYlO
Construction
NASA 2X Historic
PBS B-2
AEDCJ6
Current Schedule
4-2010
Revised &
Approved 1509
Original 1509
Priorto PDR
Cost Team - Opt.
1A
(65% CI)
Independent
Assessment
Contingency
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VAB Door Refurbishment
A Tale of Two Projects
D %building done cost plus
D % building done fixed price
D Which one cost more?
6/21/2011
Other Recent Facility Projects
Cost and Schedule Growth
Essentially the same scope
done by the same contractor
D Cost Plus VAS Door Renovation-
• $ 9.5 M original estimate
• $56.5 M final cost
• 5.95 times original estimate
D Fixed Price VAS Door Renovation
• $27.0 M original estimate
• $27.6 M final cost
• 1.02 times original estimate
D Cost Plus Processing Facility
• $135 M original estimate
• $135M @ 60% design complete
• $163M @ 90% design complete + 5%
• $180M @1 00% design complete
• $370 M current estimate
• 2.74 times original estimate
• Scheduled duration 8.6 years 1.75 times longer than original estimate
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Ok theremai! be some risk....
What are the causes?
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My Personal Assessment
Root Cause Analysis
1. Deliberate lowball estimates & optimistic assumptions
D Often with management uencouragement" to get project approved
D Once approved, and billions are spent, it's difficult to cancel project
D Projects repeatedly understate required reserves
Despite history of overruns
What is there is often transferred to other overrunning projects
When problems arise, money is "borrowed" from next task
Cash eventually runs out and, if more is not available, work gets delayed
Problems compound and project costs balloon
2. NaIve
D Project optimistic about risks & ability to defeat technical challenges
Costs & schedules are based on best-case scenario and ignores risk impacts
D Project always assume they will quickly overcome challenges
Problems that delay one task have ripple effect on next task, and the next one
o Delays have associated cost impacts, such as keeping workers while awaiting resolution of
big problems.
3. Engineers want to build perfect systems
D Big difference in costs, and "good enough" is all that is required
- Gets complex, and management cant or wont argue details
4. Ignorelinfluence independent assessments
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Example of Assumption Problems
Shuttle Operations Concept 1974
What was estimated
OPF Today
What was built
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What is Good Enough?
D Common for engineers to "gold plate" specifications
D They want a perfect system - This is safe
D Example we built a 2,400 SF (223 SM) storage facility
D Engineers specified $18,000 electric panel when a $480 panel is
more than adequate
D This is not a critical facility - Its for boat stora~
20
Cost Expenditures
Testing
Early Design Choices
Affect Ability to Influence Costs
Cost Influence
High Low ~.~le
Influence ~n~e ~.enc..D~ I.IC'''
" ~" \~
Low L- ......J .!...._...:::=;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ..J.
High
ATP
Time
Start
Operations
Rule of Thumb - The earlier a decision/change is made the lower the impact
will be to schedule and budget and money
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Top Reasons Reality Exceeds Initial Projections
• Planning Stage • Implementation Stage
• Budget is $1 DDM so estimate has • Deny existence of any problems as
to be $1 DDM or less long as possible
• Often driver of other issues • Initial emphasis often placed on
• Belief problems will be easily overcome scheduIe
• Optimistic Assumptions • Drives shortcuts
• Money will show up on time • Scope changes
• We can use previous design from • "Desirements" creep in
another project "as is" • Change orders required
• Escalation will be low • Initial assumptions were optimistic &
• Lack of accountability incorrect
• Historically no real repercussions for • Project not adequately planned due to
overrun, but rewards for starting schedule pressure
• Desire for perfection • Zero cost change orders
• We have to "hurry up" and award • Funding doesn't show up on time,
contracts to meet schedule or is cut
• Initial schedule often politically set • Big problem on international projects
• Lack of adequate upfront planning • Unintended consequences
• True requirements not clearly defined • the ripple effect
• Risks not identified • Lack of cost and schedule controls
• Insufficient contin enc
I nore/lnfluence Inde endent estimates 23
Escalation Assumptions Should be Realistic
NASA New Start Escalation Index
12% -,-------------------------------,Rand - 1981
escalation
accounts for
11.2°"fa of
project cost
growth
880/0 probability
assumed
escalation will
be exceeded
10%
8%
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:::s
c
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Realistic Assumption?
Annual Average 50/0
-------t-------
~"------
- - - - - - - - - - - - --t-,r------- - - - - - -
1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Year
"The current efforts to help revive the economy are likely to produce inflation
that could be worse than what the country suffered in the late 1970s."
Warren Buffett, March 2009
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The Cost Of Change
Nothing is Free
D Every document, change, report, study, review, test, analysis, conference,
telephone call, etc., has a cost in manpower & material. All too frequently
managers will delude themselves into thinking an action has " no cost" or
" no impact" when the true assessment would be that the action can be
undertaken with a relatively small effort. Also, decisions to change an item are
frequently made without a thought-out assessment of all aspects of the task &
with only an assessment of the visible work involved.
D For example, when workshop was in the final stages of preparation, a number of
decals (containing operating instructions) were judged to be less clear than
was possible. When the final bill was known, each decal change cost tens of
thousands of dollars, all accountable**. The visible task, removal of the old
decal, the preparation & installation of the new, was only a few dollars, as you
would suspect. However, good aerospace procedures were used & work orders
had to be prepared & processed, the work had to be reviewed & inspected, the
drawings had to be changed, the change had to be processed, drawing lists had
to be modified, test procedures modified & reviewed, crew checklists had to be
changed, & to all this, overhead costs had to be added.
D Changing options, may reduce cost, but a price must be paid for everything.
o SKYLAB LESSONS LEARNED AS APPLICABLE TO A LARGE SPACE STATION, A dissertation
submitted to the faculty of The School of Engineering & Architecture Of the Catholic University of
America For the Degree Doctor of Engineering by William C. Schneider, Washington, D.C., 1976.
**Sticker changes cost in excess of 1OOK each in FY11 $ 25
Don't Assume All Contractors Are Honest
Northrop Settles False Claims Case
Northrop Grumman Corp. has agreed to pay $12.5 million to federal
government to settle allegations that it submitted false claims to
government agencies in connection with electronic parts it supplied for
navigation systems for military airplanes, helicopters and submarines.
Northrop's accused of failing to test commercial-grade electronic
components to ensure they would function at extreme temperatures
required for military & space uses.
D Number of DOD actions for contracting fraud FY01-FY10
D SAIC 139,331
D Lockheed Martin 119,499
D Northrop Grumman 99,454
D Raytheon 76,515
D General Dynamics 68,339
D Boei~g 51,856 Actions
D Honeywell 55,078
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"Rogue Contractors"
D Pentagon Paid $998,798 to Ship Two 19-Cent Washers
D 2007 - Small South Carolina parts supplier collected -$20.5 million over six
years for fraudulent shipping costs, including
- $998,798 to ship two 19-cent washers to Fort Bliss (Army base in Texas)
$455,009 to ship three machine screws costing $1.31 ea. to Habbaniyah, Iraq
$293,451 to ship 89-cent split washer to Patrick Air Force Base, Florida
D Exploited flaw in automated DOD purchasing system:
Shipping bills to combat areas or U.S. bases labeled "priority" usually paid
automatically
D C&D & 2 of its officials barred in December from receiving federal contracts
Charlene Corley, 46, was fined $750,000.
Faces maximum prison sentence of 20 years on each count
D Fraudulent billing started in 2000
Started small & got more aggressive over time when invoices not questioned
Purchase price of items rarely reached $100 & totaled -$68,000 over six years
Total shipping charges paid were $20.5 million
D Scheme Detected
In September after purchasing agent noticed $969,000 bill for shipping two 19-
cent washers
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Confirmation Bias
D Philosopher Francis Bacon in 1620
D "the human understanding, once it has adopted an opinion, collects
any instances that confirm it, & though the contrary instances
may be more numerous & more weighty, it either does not
notice them or else rejects them, in order that this opinion will
remain unshaken"
D People have an unjustified bias in favor of their opinion
o Much tougher when critiquing validity of information that undercuts one of
their currently held theories than they are in supporting information that
apparently endorses one of their own tenets.
o Employing this double standard, tend to dismiss information that doesn't fit
with what they already believe.
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Stating the Obvious
D Estimates only as good as inputs provided
D In 2008 MIT surveyed 80 systems engineers
They were asked a series of questions that included
o How many countries have McDonalds?
o What is range of a Minuteman Missile in miles?
o How long in minutes & seconds is song Stop in the Name of Love?
o How many rulers has England had in the last 1,000 years?
o How tall is Sears Tower in meters?
Asked large enough range to provide 90%> certainty answer correct
o Example - I am 90% sure that there are between 50 & 150 countries with McDonalds
• 83°!c> of Systems Engineers got 50% or less answers correct.
- Worse in 221 times experts said they were 100% sure, only correct only 730/0 of the time
D 1999 study of 27,000 expert predictions - did not vindicate their "expertness"
as anticipated.
o Error rates many times what experts predicted.
o No advantage for experts holding advanced degrees.
• Why is this important?
• If a system engineer tells you they are 90°A> certain about something - They
will be WRONG much of the time!!
• Base as many inputs as possible on objective data - not opinions
liin god we trust; all others must bring data" Edward Deming
Conclusions
D Presentation probably not what you expected
o Before you can get help you have to admit there is a problem
D My crystal ball says there is a high probability that SKA will
overrun current cost and schedule budgets
D I strongly suggest that project
o Build in options that can be easily cut, or done later, when problems arise
o Do one or more independent assessments that are truly independent
o Have strong project management team with business background
30
I I
Backup
31
The
Joint Confidence Level Paradox:
- A History of Denial •
2009
NASA Cost Symposium
(Tuesday, April 28th)
D If you are interested in this
topic, I wrote a 100 page
paper on the subject
D Email me for copy
D Glenn.C.Butts@nasa.gov
Page 32
We Claim to Seek Accurate Estimates
D Yet, we;
o Persist in submitting optimistic initial estimates
o Omit probable scope from our estimates that often become "real."
o Exclude credible risks from our analysis
- SM&A actively mitigates risks with a likelihood of occurrence of only one in several
thousand, & are supported by management.
D Management mantra
o "if status quo is assumed, we will get the status quo"
Meaning status quo is too expensive
There are valid reasons for why things cost what they cost
Excuse for under-estimating projects
D Possible conclusions:
o Accurate estimates are impossible, especially at early stages
- The variables are too complex, unquantifiable, & incalculable - NOT
o We really don't want accurate estimates;
Primary concern is keeping program viable & funded as long as possible
Early estimates are deliberately misrepresented & meant to gain aIDlroval
33
How Do We Underestimate?
- Let Me Count The Ways -
Rand Study - Reason
for 740/0 of Cost Growth
1. OMIT PROBABLE SCOPE from estimate
2. OMIT POSSIBLE RISKS from analysis
D Internal & External
3. UNREALISTIC, OPTIMISTIC assumptions
4. Use historically LOW ESCALATION projections
D Rand Study - Reason for 11.2% of Cost Growth
5. Issue cost estimates in BASE YEAR dollars
D Estimates should be in then year dollars (escalated to year in which it is spent)
6. Many estimates NOT PREPARED BY A BONA FIDE ESTIMATOR
D Everyone's a estimator
D Being certified no guarantee of having necessary experience
7. REWARD failure, PUNISH honesty
D In my opinion many managers don't want good estimates
8. NOT ENOUGH TIME to prepare CREDIBLE estimates
D Time often spent doing "what if' exercises, or splitting dollars into arbitrary buckets
D Spend more time in reviews & defending estimates than preparing them
1'-'
"I reject a system that rewards failure & protects a
person from its consequences"
- Barack Obama -
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Early Estimates are Often Deliberate Misrepresentation
Polite way of Saying Lying .
D Conclusions from the largest study of its kind:
o Examined 258 large transportation projects
o Underestimation has not decreased during past 70 yrs.
o It was found with overwhelming statistical significance that
cost underestimation cannot be explained by error.
"Is best explained by strategic misrepresentation, namely lying,
with a view to getting projects started."
o Cost overruns of 50°A> to 100% in real terms are common.
Overruns above 100%> are not uncommon.
o Accuracy is gained at each successive stage of progress.
o Promoters routinely ignore, hide, or otherwise leave out
important project costs & risks in order to make total costs
appear low.
• Cost underestimation occurred in almost 9 out of 10 projects.
- The likelihood of actual costs being larger than estimated is 86%>
- The likelihood of actual costs being lower than estimated is 14%>
This study looked at comparatively simple projects.
Statistics for more complex projects would likely be worse!
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Planning Stage
We don't adequately study project before we commit.
Don't want to "waste" money on studies.
Spending More
Money During
Early Phase =
Substantially Less
Cost Growth
25205 10 15
Study Phase Cost as a Percent
of Development Cost
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International Space Station
D 1984 President Reagan directed NASA to build a space.station
within a decade and to invite other countries to join the endeavor.
D 1991 the US House of Representatives held the first of 22 separate
votes on whether to proceed with the program.
D As a result of overruns it came within 1 vote of cancellation in 1993.
D "For years the agencies cost overruns and schedule delays
supplied ammunition for annual congressional attempts to kill the
International Space Station" - Florida Today
I I
Multiple International Partners Adds Complexity
• The more partners the more risk is added to the project.
• If one partner has difficulties it often has ripple affects
• ESA's way of doing business is even less efficient than NASA's
because they have the added complexity of making sure on any given
project all 18 member nations puts in funding for a given project that
matches their percentage "ownership" in ESA.
• This can often make their contracting more difficult because they just
can't let Company X in Country A do something that they are most
efficient at and instead have to let the work be done by Company Y in
Country 8 to keep the percentages correct.
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International Partners
o The ISS
o "The U.S. developmental effort cannot be isolated from these occurrences and their
associated impacts: the Program has experienced cost growth and schedule slippage
associated with this broad level of international involvement." Source
http://history.nasa.gov/32999.pdf
o Another ISS resource about international partner risks - see Appendix C, International
Participation. From http://oig.nasa.gov/congressional/testimony040401.doc
o The ITER project
o "The expert panels identified a number of factors arising from significant changes in
circumstances and the parameters of the work necessary and contributing to the increases
of cost estimates between 2001 and 2008. The most important factors relate to: increased
complexity of project integration in managing interfaces across seven ITER Parties (in 2001
only 3 Parties were foreseen to execute the project)" Source
http://fire.pppl.gov/iter europa cost 050610.pdf
o GAO report. From !!nP:llwww.gao.gov/new.items/d09306s~
o "These partnerships go a long way to foster international cooperation in space, but they
also put NASA projects in a vulnerable position when partners do not meet their obligations
or run into technical obstacles they cannot easily overcome."
o "Project officials also commented that Aquarius had changes to its baseline due to slips by
its development partner, the CONAE, [Argentina] and that they believe the NASA
contribution to this mission is on schedule for completion in March 2009. They added that
the benefit of the international partnership, plus the groundbreaking information about the
Earth's climate, out weigh the additional costs, which NASA has chosen to absorb within its
budQet. 39
Report to the Committee on Science, House of Representatives
May 2004
GAO-04-642 Report @ http//www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-642
o "Lack of Disciplined Cost-Estimating Processes Hinders Effective
Program Management"
D NASA lacks clear understanding of programs cost &schedules.
Estimates for more than half of programs reviewed have increased-as much as
94 percent.
Cost Estimates increased 80% of time
Variability in cost estimates indicates programs lacked sufficient knowledge
needed to establish priorities, quantify risks, & make informed investment
decisions, & thus predict costs.
D "NASA's basic cost-estimating processes-an important tool for
managing programs-lack discipline needed to ensure that
estimates are reasonable."
D None of programs reviewed in detail met all cost-estimating criteria.
D "NASA has limited ability to collect program cost & schedule data
needed to meet basic cost-estimating criteria."
D NASA does not have a system to capture reliable financial & performance data-
key to using effectively the cost-estimating tools that NASA officials state that
ro rams em 10 .
D NASA identified other barriers, including limited cost-estimating
staff.
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GAO Cost Estimating Criteria
1) Objectives of estimate shall be 8) Uncertainties in parameter values
stated in writing. are identified & quantified.
2) Life cycle to which estimate 9) If schedule is imposed, estimate
applies is clearly defined. for normal schedule shall be
3) Tasks appropriately sized. compared to additional cost
4) Estimated cost & schedule are required to meet imposed
schedule.consistent with demonstrated
accomplishments of other 10) If more than one estimating
projects. approach is used, variances are
5) Written summary of parameter analyzed & explained.
values & their rationales 11 ) Independent assessment concur
accompany estimate. with the values & methodology.
6) Assumptions shall be identified 12) Estimates kept current.
& explained. 13) Estimates integrated with project
7) Structured process such as a planning & tracking.
template or format shall be used 14) EVM is used to manage program.
to ensure that key factors are not
overlooked.
Basically - Good Processes & Documentation 41
---- - - ~---------------
Underestimates are ~othing New - Quotes from 1964
All but One from Apollo Executives Meeting
L _
o "1 can think of a lot ofprograms in the Boeing Company where, if the estimate
had been realistic, you wouldn't have had the program, & that is the truth."
w. M. Allen - President/ Boeing
o "You have basically built into the entire system a series of events which
very much leads to under-estimating what the program is going to cost. "
J. S. Parker - Vice President/ GE
o "As advocates of new programs, government agencies have often
encouraged contractors to estimate costs optimistically.
o Recognizing that headquarters might be shocked out of supporting a program
where true costs were revealed at the outset.
o They have sought to disclose cost increases gradually, after programs have
gained momentum & cancellation has become difficult. "
Dr. Frederic Scherer - Harvard
o "We can give you estimates all the way to the end of the Saturn-IVB, but do
you really want to know it?"
Donald W Douglas - President Douglas Aircraft
Underestimates documented back to 1869 - probably prior.
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Common Causes of Cost Problems
D Optimistic assumptions
D Poor estimating techniques/standards/processes
D Inadequate work breakdown structure
D Technology readiness
D Managerial edicts to reduce estimates by eliminating "fat"
D Inadequate planning that results in increased scope
D Requirements creep
D Unforeseen technical problems
D Schedule delays
D Inadequate workforce skill mix
D Contractor buy in
D Lack of historical data
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Common Causes of Cost Overruns
o Failure to understand customer requirements
o Unrealistic assessment of current capabilities
o Underestimating time requirements
o Omissions (inadvertent or deliberate)
o Misinterpretation of information
o Inappropriate estimating techniques
o Failure to identify &concentrate on major cost elements
o Failure to recognize &plan for risks
o Ignore external risks
o Pressure to compromise early
o Ceiling Costs
o Must win mentality (Success Oriented)
o Poorly written contractual requirements
o Proposal team different from Project team
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Forgotten SPACE SHUTTLE Facts
o Initially approved by 1 Vote
D Congress WAS concerned about estimates
o FY 1972 Estimate
D DDT&E $5.5 Billion + 20%) Contingency =$6.6 Billion
- Contingency Reportedly Removed by Congress
D Facilities $0.3 Billion
D 1st Manned Flight projected by June 1976 (4 yrs.)
liThe chance of a Shuttle launch on
November 20 1980 is probably 10 to 20%"
Dr. Frosch NASA - Administrator
Congressional Testimony 1980
o Reality - 1982
D Total Cost $17.789 Billion
- DDT&E $13.138 Billion
Production $ 3.900 Billion
Facilities $ 0.703 Billion
D 1st Manned flight occurred in APril 1981 (9 yrs.)
o Increase WAS Foreseen . ..
D "Considering all of the technological & operational unknowns involved in the shuttle
development & the fact that no vehicles of similar function have ever been designed before or
have ever operated over the range of flight regimes required for the shuttle, prudent
extrapolation ofprior experience would indicate that estimated development costs may be 30
to 50 percent on the low side. Thus, the estimates of $6. 5 billion in RDT&E for the Mk I/Mk "
shuttle program may range between $8.5 to $10 billion, reflecting increased program costs of
$2.5 to $3.5 billion. Similar uncertainties must be considered to apply to other non-recurring
costs such as production & facilities (amounting to about $4 billion). Thus a possible cost
uncertainty of about $5 billion for total program costs might be envisioned giving a high
estimate of total non-recurring cost of about $15 billion." - October 1971 Report-
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Were to Start? - Elements That Influence Costs
D What - is project scope?
D What are boundaries of work
D Who will do required work outside
boundaries?
D Who - will do
D Design?
Self
On call A&E
NewA&E
On board Support contractors
D Self perform work
D Sub out
D Work? - FFP or Cost Plus
On board support contractors
D Self perform work
D Sub out
General Contractor
General Contractor & Sub Contractor's
DHow - will project be bid?
D Full & open
D Source board
D IDIQ
D Sole source
8a - Disadvantaged
Support contractor
Other
D Best value
D Design build
D Cost plus
D Where - will project be done
D On center
D Off center
Costs may change with location change
D When - will the project be done
D Required for escalation calculations
. D Anticipated market conditions
Negative or positive
Point
Details Matter!
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CLCS Summary - Lessons Learned
$400 M Software Project
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Independent Project Oversight
Vigorous independent review process critical to ensure early warning to senior management. Huge
Senior management must follow-up on independent reviews & control performance
Control Project Requirements Overruns
Control requirements early & ensure understanding of them between stakeholders
Must be placed under configuration control- with no changes unless through analysis is done Project
Any changes must be carefully balanced by cost, development & operational risks C
Risk Management Mitigation anceled
Clear identification of each significant risk, their probability of occurrence, impact of risks on project, & clear plan for risk
mitigation are critical to project success
Cultural impediment to implementation are significant and must be overcome
Implement periodic validation of risk assessment by group external to the project
System Integration & Performance Management
Implement an effective Systems Engineering group to be responsible & accountable for systems design, integration,
performance analysis & verification
Lack of early planning manifests itself in cost overruns, failed acceptance testing, slipped schedules, and disruption of planned
integration of interfacing systems.
Milestones
Project milestones must explicitly defines what capabilities are included in each
Communications
Project managers must focus on meeting approved requirements while controlling cost & schedule.
Communication, requirement definition & integration should be prime management metric.
Estimating
Sound cost & schedule estimating early, including a bottoms-up cost estimate, coupled with use of accurate performance
management system is essential to meeting project goals.
Contract Vehicle
Contracts should be structured such that performance on important work has an overall effect on performance award.
Caution should be utilized such that the conflict of interests are created
NASA continues to relearn lessons already learned from the past.
A3 Lessons Learned
D Phased Funding
D Not delivered when promised
Drove segmenting of bid packages
D Budget cut
Have de-scope options planned ~ SKA?
D Requirements
D Geographically separated teams maintain separate requirements documents
Drove Change Orders & Schedule slips
o LOX barges pumps changed, new requirement for VFDs. Great impact to electrical power systems
(requiring larger diameter wiring, conduit, etc). However, decision NOT coordinated with A-3 project.
D All not available until design 30% complete - Impact cost and schedule
D Concept, schedule & budget locked before all requirements known
Initial concept did NOT include plans for buildings to house electronic equipment required for
facility control & capturing test data.
Planned availability dates for necessary buildings not incorporated into overall project
schedule making it extremely difficult to plan for installation, verification, and activation tasks
D Not reviewed by ALL the necessary stakeholders
D AII"rated" equally - some critical, some are not - all could not be met
Vendors unaware of importance did not meet some requirements with proposals
D Project data maintained on three different database systems
Everyone does not have access to all systems, so data duplicated & not always updated
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A3 Lessons Learned
D Design changes
o Result of review comments and resulting in scope growth/cost growth
o Design schedule difficult to maintain with changing scope
o Cryogenic tanks resized due to high bids - driven by transportation costs
Drove changes to other systems
Original size tanks could have been shipped by barges, not investigated
o Design errors / conflicting data
Driven in part by schedule, in part by late stage design changes
D Rush to maintain schedule/budget
o Required contract awards before design complete - caused cost of some contracts to
double
o Defer factory work to field, where skills not always available to perform
o Company who will install items did not order them
When they arrived late, installation contractor got change order
Another company responsible for transportation
o Preliminary System Hazard Analysis was not performed in concept phase
Drove later changes to mitigate hazards
o Short timeline on requests for budget / schedule actions
Does not provide sufficient time to properly evaluate requirements & formulate plan
o Example - request to provide estimate for Low Speed Video System in one day
o Subsequent costs were higher, and additional funding difficult to obtain
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•A3 Lessons Learned
D Bureaucracy
D Nine months to order equipment, delivery only took 6-8 weeks after order finally placed
- This occurred on small orders $150K & less
Small contracts should be treated differently than big ones
D Excessive regular meetings that project consume time which could be applied to productive
work
Three to six meetings a week in various forums, does not allow sufficient time to perform project
actions
D Failure to utilizing remote meeting capability effectively
- It good to have face-to-face meetings yet as a project progresses, travel times for meetings can
impact delivery schedules
Use of internet format meetings allows sharing of technical documents with minimal interruptions to
productive work
D Regulations on contract value limits drove splitting of bid packages into small packages
- Increased confusion
Increase coordination work on project team
D Risks
D Optimistic initial estimates by people with vested interest in gaining project approval
D Failure to accept independent cost assessment
Exerted pressure to force retraction and agreement with projects number
D Hurricane Katarina
Due to rebuilding efforts costs were substantially higher than estimated
D Other
D Coordination of multiple contracts on scope & availability sometimes a problem
- If project was one large fixed price contract you know who has scope
o Items in design don't get lost in the shuffle 51
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Lessons Learned
D Project Formulation
o Watch out for unrealistic cost and schedule estimates resulting from:
D Inaccurate/incomplete understanding of requirements for spaceflight end items
D "low balling" in order to get an ATP
D an overrating of the technology maturity
D Procurement
o Never agree to a cost plus fixed fee contract for a research, design
and development effort
D The contractor bears no risk -- it's all on the government
D The government has no leverage with the contractor -- no incentives (positive or
negative) for addressing problems
Lessons Learned
o Project management
o Contractor Project Manager should have a proven track record (deliveries,
communications, risk management)
o Don't skimp on oversight functions -- match each major contract
skill/function with an accountable government counterpart
o You must have reliable, accurate, and timely cost reporting
o Pay close attention to environments:
o Perform functional testing in relevant environment to the extent possible
o For situations you can't thoroughly test for, do "what if' study to find
possible effects and solutions
o Don't ignore quirky test data -- it may be telling you something important
o Develop back up plans for all reasonably possible contingencies
o Conduct comprehensive failure or anomaly investigations
o Take whatever action is necessary to control the contractor -- be prepared
to descope or terminate
o Take risks for good reasons and with management's buy-in
o Trust dedicated, "can do" team members to come up with creative solutions
~- :__ .. _-
